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Those who can find out what to do in organized business are scarce. Those who can
find out how to do it are scarcer still.
GEORGE BERNARD SHAw, EVERYBODY'S POLITICAL WHAS'S WHAT

'35 ('945)INTRODUCTION

To the extent that the labor-relations problems of "small" businessmen are distinguishable-in kind-from the labor-relations problems of "large" businessmen,
they are so as much because of ignorance and lack of power as because of any fundamentally different treatment in law. Indeed, in relatively few areas in which the law
treats of employment relations are there distinctions based upon the size alone.
Distinctions in statutory regulating schemes which are based upon size (perfectly
valid constitutional distinctions, by the way1) may take the form of variations in
volume of business, 2 size of contracts with the federal government 3 number of
* LL.B. 1941, DePaul University. Member of the California and Illinois bars.
'New York v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
' The NLRB is empowered to prevent any person from engaging in certain unfair labor practices
"affecting commerce." National Labor Relations Act § io(a), 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 16o(a)
(1952). This specific provision was left unchanged by the Taft-Hartley amendments. 61 STAT. 146 (1947).
The Board may cede this power to state agencies by agreement with them if the state statute or construction is not inconsistent with the federal scheme. This statutory grant of power to the Board is
most broad, but the Board has never exercised the full measure of its jurisdiction. For a number of
years, the Board decided case-by-case whether to take jurisdiction. But in 1950, it concluded that
"experience warrants the establishment and announcement of certain standards" which would govern
the exercise of its jurisdiction. Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635, 636 (1950). And the
Board then published standards, largely in terms of dollar amounts of interstate inflow and outflow.
Press Release, October 6, I95O, 26 L.R.R.M. 50. In 1954, a sharply divided Board, see Breeding Transfer Co., no N.L.R.B. 493 (1954), revised the jurisdictional standards upward, thus removing many
cases from the jurisdiction of the Board. Press Release, July 15, 1954, 34 L.R.R.M. 75. In Guss v.
Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957), the Supreme Court noted, while denying access to an
employer to a state agency with reference to a labor dispute covered by the National Labor Relations
Act which fell under the existing jurisdictional standards, that there was a "vast no-man's-land, subject to
regulation by no agency or court." Id. at 1o. The Court suggested that "Congress is free to change
the situation at will," and that "the National Labor Relations Board can greatly reduce the area of the
no-man's-land by reasserting its jurisdiction and, where States have brought their labor laws into
conformity with federal policy, by ceding jurisdiction under Section xo(a)." Id. at ii. The Board, in
its Press Release of October 2, 1958, 42 L.R.R.M. 96, noted the Congress' approval of an appropriation
requested by the Board which would allow the extension of the Board's jurisdiction in some of the
uncovered area, and announced new standards:
.

Nonretal: $5o,ooo outflow or inflow, direct or indirect. (Direct outflow refers to goods shipped
or services furnished by the employer outside the state. Indirect outflow includes sales within
the state to users meeting any standard except solely an indirect inflow or indirect outflow standard.
Direct inflow refers to goods or services furnished directly to the employer from outside the
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state in which the employer is located. Indirect inflow refers to the purchase of goods or services
which originated outside the employer's state, but which he purchased from a seller within the
state. Direct and indirect outflow may be combined, and direct and indirect inflow may also be
combined, to meet the $5o,0oo requirement. However, outflow and inflow may not be combined.)
(954-$5o,ooo outflow, $500,000 inflow, $ioo,ooo indirect outflow, $s,ooo,ooo indirect inflow.)
2. Offlce buildings: Gross revenue of Soo,ooo of which $25,0o0

or more is derived from organiza-

tions which meet any of the new standards.
(1954-Employer who leases or owns and who operates must be otherwise in commerce and
utilize building primarily to house its own offices.)
3. Retail concerns: $5oo,ooo gross volume of business.
(1954-Direct inflow of $Si,ooo,ooo, or indirect inflow of $2,000,000 or direct outflow of

$soo,ooo.)
4.Instrumentalities links and channels of interstate commerce: $5o,ooo from interstate (or linkage)
part of enterprise or from services performed for employers in commerce.
(1954-Ioo,ooo.)

5.Public utilities: $250,000 gross volume, or meet standard i (nonretail).
(1954-$3,ooo,ooo gross volume.)
6. Transit systems: $25o,ooo gross volume. (Except taxicabs, as to which the retail ($5oo,ooo gross
volume of business) test shall apply.)
(1954-$3,ooo,ooo gross volume.)
7. Newspapers and communications systems: Radio, television, telegraph, and telephone: Sxoo,ooo
gross volume. Newspapers: $200,000 gross volume.
(1954-5oo,ooo test for newspapers, $200,000 for the others.)
8. National defense: Substantial impact on national defense.
(1954-$zoo,ooo in goods or services directly related to national defense, and pursuant to government contract.)
9. Business in the Territories and District of Columbia:
D.C ..........................Plenary.
Territories .................... Standards apply.

(Same as 1954.)
Regarded as single employer.
(Same as 1954.)

1o. Associations:

It appears that the Board may never get around to entering into any cession agreements because of
the difficulty of complying with the conditions imposed on them by § xo(a). Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, supra. As to the validity of the Board's criteria for exercising jurisdiction, see Hotel Employees Local No. 255 v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958).
The maxim de minimis non curat lex may cause an administrative agency to refuse to take jurisdiction of a given situation over which it might normally be expected to exercise such jurisdiction. See,
e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Denver Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (i95i). The
Attorney General for Pennsylvania argued before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently that a
window cleaning company doing annually $40,i65 in volume of which $12,x62 was derived from
services to 25 companies affecting interstate commerce would not be considered for relief by the
National Labor Relations Board under the de minimis doctrine. 43 L.R.R.M. 71 (958).
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, minimum wage and overtime provisions do not apply with
respect to employees working on newspapers whose circulation is less than 4,000 (if the major part of
this circulation is in the county where it is published or in contiguous counties), to switchboard
operators who work in public telephone exchanges which have not more than 750 stations, or to employces or proprietors of telegraph agencies in exempt retail establishments if the telegraph message
revenue of the agency does not exceed $S5oo per month. 52 STAT. 1o67 (1938), 29 U.S.C. 5 213(a)
(19.52).

'Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, 49 STAT. 2O36' 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1952), which provides
that any contract made by any department or agency of the United States, the District of Columbia,
or by any corporation all the stock of which is beneficially owned by the United States for the manufacture
or furnishing of materials, supplies, articles, and equipment in any amount exceeding So,ooo must include
provisions relating to the level of wages paid and overtime restrictions. A contractor may carry on
business with the Government well in excess of Slo,ooo and still not be subject to the Act, so long as no
one contract exceeds $xo,ooo.
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personnel employed, 4 number of employees covered under pension and welfare plans,5
and the specific activity of the employer, which may incidentally and by its nature be
"small."" These various distinctions imply "smallness" versus "bigness," and while it
would ease this analysis by having at hand a convenient, arbitrary definition of small
business, there is really no completely satisfactory way of dividing employers into
these two groups. Perhaps it will prove adequate merely to refer to these two
classes as though one knew exactly which they embrace and leave it to the individual
entrepreneur to choose the more fitting description for himself.
Having, however, set out these few instances in which size of the employer may
determine whether a given statutory scheme may apply to him, we are thrown back
to discovering the basic reason why one should discuss small business labor relations
problems at all. Are they really different in kind from the problems of larger
business?
To a practitioner, it does not appear that such labor problems as a small businessman may have are different radically from those of his larger counterpart. What
does appear to be different is the variation in attitudes and methods of solving these
problems. These seem to spring from the fact that smallness implies some other
characteristics which enter dynamically into the problem situations. As we noted
before, smallness frequently implies less knowledge of management techniques and
of legal rights, duties, and remedies. It also implies a lesser residuum of "power"
in the individual employing unit." These two characteristics of smaller business can,
and do, justify some distinctive descriptions of small business labor problems s

I
NONCOLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROBLEMS

In the first place, it may be well to separate the field into collective bargaining
problems and all other labor-relations problems. For the most part, the small
'Ir.
Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 33o6(a), provides that the only employers subject to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act are those who employ four or more persons for not less than twenty days each

year.
5The provisions of the recently passed welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 72 STAT. 998 (1958),
29 U.S.C.A. § 303(b) (4) (Supp. 1959), effective January 1, 1959, are not applicable to employee welfare
or pension plans if they do not cover more than twenty-five employees.
8 Note, e.g., in California, the exclusions from unemployment insurance coverage of "domestic service

in a private home," "services performed as a real estate, business opportunity, mineral, oil or gas, or
cemetery broker or salesman by an individual who is licensed in one of such classes by the State and

who is remunerated solely by way of commission," and "services performed [by an individual as a golf
caddy) in caddying or carrying a golf player's clubs." CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE, div. i, pt. i,
art. 2, §§ 629, 65o, 65x. See also National Labor Relations Act, supra note 2, § 2(3).
"See the interesting, if not always pellucid, papers presented at the 1958 Meeting of the Industrial

Relations Research Association on the theme, Power in Industrial Relations-Its Use and Abuse, published in 9 LAB. L.J. 615 et seq. (1958).
'The identity of ownership and management in the small business, in contradistinction to their separa-

tion in the larger corporation, will also help explain the differences in viewing labor-relations problems.
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businessman is not unlike all other businessmen when it comes to whether he must,
under the appropriate criteria, pay a premium for overtime work, pay not less than a
minimum wage, refrain from hiring minors, provide safe, healthful, and comfortable
conditions of employment,9 pay taxes for unemployment compensation benefits, buy
insurance to cover the claims arising from injuries of his employees on the job, or not
discriminate in hiring because of race, creed, or color. Unless he is outside the
application of the legal standard for some "nonsize" reason, he has the same obligations as any other employer.
The small businessman's troubles begin when, because of lack of knowledge
of the obligations imposed upon him by statute or by the law of the collective bargaining agreement to which he may be a party, he fails to live up to those obligations and he is called upon by someone-an aggrieved employee or a governmental
agency-to conform to them. (This is not to gainsay that the small employer may
well know his obligations and intentionally seek to avoid them. Certainly such attitudes do exist: an employer may be looking for gain for himself or he may be driven
to his actions by a desire to remain in business if he is not able to see any other way
of doing so. There probably can be no abstract justification for deliberate lawevasion when the legislative body has decreed the obligations which must be met
by any entrepreneur who wishes to employ people in his enterprises.) He may have
a general knowledge of his obligations but be trapped into specific error by his unawareness of nonobvious interpretations of law by administrators or courts of both.
A good illustration of the opportunity for expensive error is the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Section 7(a) of that statute requires that
a covered employee shall receive compensation for hours worked in excess of forty
"at a rate not less than the regular rate at which he is employed." The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division has interpreted this to mean that where
employees are compensated on an incentive earnings basis, the regular rate of pay
is the rate found by dividing the hours worked in the work week into the total earnings during this same period.' Now, most collective bargaining agreements contain
specific hourly rates for the various job classifications covered in them, and these will
generally be lower than the average hourly rate computed for "pieceworkers." (Even
in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, an employee is usually hired in
Where there is this identity, there is a tendency to accept a solution of expediency and to work out a
modus operandi in as resourceful a way as possible. For a provocative discussion of the significance
of the separation of ownership and management, see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., EcoNoZ.1o POWER AND THEn
FREE SOCIETY, A PRELImINARY DiscussioN OF THE CORPORATION (958).
' "It shall be the continuing duty of the Industrial Welfare Commission . . . to ascertain the wages
paid and the hours and conditions of labor and employment in the various occupations, trades, and
industries in which women and minors are employed in this State, and to investigate the comfort, health,
safety, and welfare of such women and minors." CAL. LABoR CODE § 1173. "Every employer in any
establishment employing any female, shall provide suitable seats for all female employees and shall permit
them to use such seats when they are not engaged in the active duties of their employment." CAL.
LA OR CODE §
3.

1253.

29 C.F.R. § 778.3(b)(2).
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at some stated time rate, with an understanding that he should be able to earn more
by the operation of the incentive system. In any case, the covered employee may
not be paid less than the statutory minimum wage.) It has not been unknown, however, for an employer to use the "straight" hourly rates for the computation of overtime premium, because he could quite reasonably conclude that "regular rate" in
the statute (if he is inclined to reading statutes) means an unchanging rate from
week to week. The Administrator's interpretation in this instance has stood the
tests of litigation and subsequent congressional review,'" but these subtleties are not
necessarily part of the stock of managerial knowledge possessed by small entrepreneurs.
Unquestionably, operating any business in today's complex society is an intricate
art which requires knowledge of many disciplines, together with the administrative
ability to integrate them and apply them to the enterprise. Running a small business
requires no less knowledge, but even this fact eludes the small businessman. The
small entrepreneur many times is not at all aware that he has any problems-until
it is too late. And granted the knowledge of problems, there may be-and usually
is-a reluctance to spend the money to acquire people with the expertise to overcome the lack of information.
One may assume that the smaller businessman being discussed here is not
himself a professional accountant or lawyer. On the one hand, he will employ
bookkeepers and auditors as a matter of course. More likely than not, on the other
hand, he will retain legal counsel only when trouble has arisen. No matter why
this reluctance to seek preventive legal advice,'

he is usually well on his way to

legal trouble when he gets round to retaining counsel.
It may be concluded, therefore, that in ordinary noncollective bargaining situations, knowledge of obligations is the important thing in employment relations.'
The small businessman has many sources available for the acquisition of knowledge:
administrative agencies; trade associations and chambers of commerce;' 4 professional
advice of lawyers, accountants, and business consultants; business services; and other

publications. Experience teaches one that many small businessmen do not avail
themselves of these aids, and until they reach an understanding that knowledge is
strength, and probably money as well (even if only in the sense of penalties not incurred), they will continue not availing themselves of the knowledge.
" For a review of this matter, see Feldman, Algebra and the Supreme Court, 40 ILL. L. REV. 489
(1946).
" The useful concept of preventive law which contemplates a periodic "legal check-up" has been
developed in great depth by Louis BROWN, MANUAL OF PREVENTIVE LAW (1950), and has been effectively
See, also, Lois
applied in his valuable book, How TO NEGOTIATE A SUCCESSFUL CONTRACT (1956).
BROWN, YOUR LEGAL FACTS: INFORMATION FOR YOUR ATTORNEY (American Bar Foundation, Reproduction

Ser. No. 3) (957).
" The small employer should not overlook the usefulness of good personnel practices.
TORBERT, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

IN SMALL COMPANIES

(1958).

"' See WiLLIAm SMITH, LOCAL EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS (1955).

See FRANCES B.
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II
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. PROBLEMS

When we contemplate the small businessman and collective bargaining, we enter
another world, almost, where knowledge is, of course, vastly important, but where
accretions of power will determine the course along which the small businessman will
go.
Whether he is organized or not, the small businessman is concerned with collective
bargaining. If he has a choice of location, he is likely to avoid an area where union
organization is prevalent. But other considerations may determine location: the
desire to live in a certain city or part of the country, availability of materials, existence of a skilled labor supply, and access to customers. In the latter situations, the
entrepreneur may have more immediate concerns with union organization.
If he is confronted with an organizational campaign among his employees, or if
he is simply asked to sign a contract without consultation with or consideration of the
wishes of his employees, he is faced with the necessity for making decisions he is
quite possibly ill-equipped to make. While it is not invariably true that an employer
will seek to avoid organization, it is probably the case that he would regard himself
better off without it. His first inclination is to resist organization, and it is at this
point that his need for knowledge becomes acute and that he should become aware
of the necessity of evaluating his own power residuum. In the absence of any
applicable labor relations statute, he may rely on his own knowledge and upon his
own evaluation of the power relationships, and he may not fare badly. However,
he is not likely to know the extent of the proscriptive restrictions on his own actions
if he is an employer covered by a labor relations statute at some level. For example,
during an organizing campaign he may discharge some employees wrongfully and
unwittingly incur expensive back wage payments. He could possibly have achieved
his same objectives by communicating with his employees, but he may have refrained
from this course of action under a misconception that he must maintain complete
neutrality.' 5 Even the answer to the threshold question of whether he is a covered
employer will dictate the appropriate course of action. If it is answered incorrectly,
the results may be costly.
When the organizing group is seemingly unable to obtain a majority of employees
to join it (as evidenced by its unwillingness to go to a representation election to be
conducted, say, by the National Labor Relations Board) an employer may himself
want to go to the Board. But he may find that this is not as simple as it sounds.
First, as we have already seen, the Board's jurisdictional standards may exclude him
from its services. Then, even if he gets there, he may find that the delay due to
dilatory moves by the union or other participants or by virtue of the agency case"Where an employer had rules against the solicitation of any kind on company property and the
distribution of literature or posting of signs and it enforced them during an organizational campaign of
competing unions, but where it distributed eight pieces of antiunion but noncoercive literature, the
employer was guilty of an unfair labor practice. United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 243 F.2d
593 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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load is as damaging to him as if there were no agency. True, in some cases, Board
procedure may be speeded up because of the nature of the dispute; 16 yet, in the case
of the small businessman, any delay may be hurtful, if not fatal.
Quite possibly, the employer may not wish his case to be in Board hands, at all.
If the organizers feel they have a majority, they will file for a representation election.
In this event, the employer may wish to be free of Board interference, because
he will want to be able to handle his own problems without governmental intervention. A broadening of the Board's jurisdictional standards in this case will not
be desirable if the employer wishes to exercise his rights in accordance with local law.
The existence of the so-called "no-man's-land" does not displease or inconvenience
this employer. It is difficult, therefore, to generalize as to what course of action
in this respect should be taken by government,' 7 although what is thought by the
community to be good for big business labor relations should be no less good for
small business labor relations.
One might naturally suggest that the administrative delay be reduced, although
one man's delay may be another man's obtaining of justice.' Delay is not uniquely
a small business problem, though, for it plagues the larger business, too.
It is always problematical how long any employer of limited resources in a
relatively well-organized community can withstand a determined organizing effort. 9
Not that every small employer need collapse and beg for the best possible contract
whenever a union organizer shows up at his factory or store. Nevertheless, the cost
of resistance may be high,2 ° and unless the employees show determined refusal to
succumb to the blandishments of the organizers, few small employers can sustain
the pressure. 2 '
"0As in secondary boycott cases, where the NLRB must give priority to charges filed under § o(i)
of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 453 (1936), 29 U.S.C. § 16o (1952).
"The Small Business Administrator had at one time thought that the NLRB should broaden its
standards considerably more than it eventually did. He apparently communicated this concern to the
Board, as reported in the Washington Post and Times Herald, Sept. 4, 1958, p. D7, col. 8. Later he
appears to have indicated that the Board's proposed standards were too encompassing. Column of Drew
Pearson, Los Angeles Mirror-News, Nov. 4, 1958, p. 19, col. 7-8.
's Or as the executive secretary of the NLRB has put it: " . . one man's red tape is sometimes the
other man's due process." Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the
Labor or Management Field, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 41, at 15691 (1958). The statement was made in
conjunction with hearings into the matter of a trucking company (with seven employees) which complained that it was forced out of business (apparently due to secondary boycotts) while representation
proceedings were pending before the Board.
" The organizing techniques are varied. Unorganized small merchants, for instance, in shopping
centers may find the entire shopping center is being picketed. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairtown
Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (i957); Note, Shopping Centers and Labor Relations Law, IO STAN. L. Rav.

694 (z958).
" See testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field that the Southwestern Motor Transport had lost $i,ooo,ooo through a boycott that began
in 1954.

N.Y. Times, Nov. I8, 1958, p. 27, col. I.

" Some do. See the testimony of the President of the Galveston Truck Lines, Inc., before the Senate
Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, describing his energetic
activities and extensive litigation, while the Teamsters Union sought to organize his company, against
the hot-cargo clause, before the Interstate Commerce Commission, and under the Taft-Hartley, Sherman,
and various state antitrust acts.

Hearings, supra note i8, at 15597-625.
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Once the small employer is organized, or he has agreed to recognize the union, a
contract must be worked out and an entirely new set of problems confronts him.
Again, the relative lack of knowledge, experience, and power will work to his detriment unless he takes steps to acquire the knowledge and neutralize the complex of
power. And, again, the problems of the small employer are different only in degree
from those of the larger employer. They will take their form from many external
factors, such as the extent of collective bargaining in the area and in the trade or
industry of which the employer is a part, the relationships between production and
teamster employees and their unions, the responsibility of local union leadership, the
attitude of the entrepreneur, and his ability to pass on increased costs to his customers.
Knowledge of what conditions the union has obtained from other employers
in the industry is absolutely essential so as to enable the employer to negotiate from
a position of some strength. Obtaining this knowledge may be difficult, until one
joins an employers' organization. The appropriate association will be able to
supply knowledge about working conditions and, if it engages in collective bargaining, to enhance power through joint efforts and employer solidarity.2 2 Unfortunately,
small employers frequently do not know of the existence of such organizations 23 until
the fact situation becomes irretrievable; or they are unwilling to spend a little money
for counsel in trying circumstances. But lack of knowledge and power in negotiating
will lead to needlessly higher wage rates and more onerous administrative conditions,
as well as to restrictions which may deprive the employer of needed freedom to adopt
techniques of production24 and compensation which will enable him to survive.
Joint collective bargaining on the employers' side will at least lead to consistent
contract terms for every employing unit; and if the group is confronted with the
ultimate weapon-the strike-the possibility that all employers will shut down if
one of them is struck may conceivably act as a restraining influence on the union.
In areas where unions are strong (and where teamster union power in combination with other unions is great), the hapless employer is often at their mercy when
it comes to negotiating contract terms. While there may be a trend to uniformity and
a development of "patterns" on the part of the settlements, unions are in a real
sense limited in the wages and conditions they may exact by their knowledge that if
some limit is exceeded, the employer will be forced out of business and the union
members will lose their jobs. Employers cannot rely on these limitations on unions,
though, and power must be faced with power.
2 In addition to the literature referred to in NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353
U.S. 87, 95-96, nn. 23, 24, 25 (1957), see JEssE T. CARPENTER, EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN NEW YoRx CITY (1950); CLARENCE E. BONNETT, HISTORY OF EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS IN

THE UNITED STATES (1956); HENRY W. EHRMANN, ORGANIZED BUSINESS IN FRANCE (1957).

"' Some unions may indicate to a newly-won shop that it should join a given employers' association
and thus obtain a "standard" industry contract.
"See the attack on "methods-time-measurement" (M-T-M) by the Upholsterers' International Union.
UIU Journal, July 1958, p. 4-
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5 The
By combining employing units, small employers may wield great power!

problem is getting the small employers to get together in the first place and getting
them to remain together in the face of negotiating crises. In the latter instance, it

may be difficult to keep the group from breaking up for any length of time because
of financial instability or because of sheer opportunism on the part of individual

employers.
CONCLUSION

Smaller employers have the same labor relations problems, we now see, as larger
employers. The problems differ in degree only, not in kind. But the approach of
the small businessman unused to employing professional counsel will be relatively
unskilled and less farsighted than that of his larger counterpart.
Essentially, the course for the small businessman is dear: he must obtain knowledge and power. If he is to be successful, he must work at this quest just as much
as at any other phase of his business, be it design, finance, or sales. And he must

be prepared to pay for this knowledge and power, just as he would for any other
element of his enterprise. There need be no special legislation, special agencies,
special counsel for any small businessmen in this area of activity. There must be

only a special desire and special effort to acquire the knowledge and strength needed
for carrying out any policy decisions which the small businessman may have made! 6
" The union struck one member of an eight-member employer bargaining association as part of a
"whipsawing" strategy. The next day, the other seven members laid off their employees, whereupon the
union subsequently filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB. The Supreme Court upheld
the employers' actions. "Although the [National Labor Relations] Act protects the right of the
employees to strike in support of their demands, this protection is not so absolute as to deny self-help
by employers when legitimate interests of employees and employers collide. Conflict may arise, for
example, between the right to strike and the interest of small employers in preserving multi-employer
bargaining, as a means of bargaining on an equal basis with a large union and avoiding the competitive
disadvantages resulting from non-uniform contractual terms. The ultimate problem is the balancing
of the conflicting legitimate interests. The function of striking that balance to effectuate national labor
" NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No.
policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility ..
Under similar circumstances, it is quite likely that unemployment
449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957).
insurance benefits will not be awarded to the locked-out employees. Feldman, Unemployment Insurance:
Its Ellect on Trade Disputes in California, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 604 (1958).
8
"Though every indi' MYLFs L. MACE, THE BOARD OF DIREc'ros iN SmfaLL CORPOaTIONS (948).
vidual is unique and different, separate laws cannot be made for every individual; therefore, the individual must fit himself to the law instead of having it fitted to him." GEOROE BERNARD SIAW, EVERYThe special counsel of the AFL-CIO, Mr. Arthur J.
192 (944).
BooY's POLITICAL VHMT's WHAT?
Goldberg, has suggested the creation of a government-sponsored Labor-Management Assembly. The
"present membership of the Business Advisory Council, enlarged by representative small businessmen
[should] constitute the industry representation." AFL-CIO News, Nov. 15, 1958, p. 6, col. 3. Provided
that such a body could serve a constructive purpose, it would certainly give more validity to the
Assembly's conclusions.

